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Introduction
Disasters can significantly affect human health 
and seriously disrupt the functioning of society. 
They cause widespread human, material, or 
environmental losses that exceed local capacity 
to respond, and call for external assistance.1 These 
events can be categorized as natural, human-
induced, and complex. Natural events include 
tornadoes and earthquakes, human-induced include 
accidental chemical spills and terrorist events, and 
complex include famine and war. Disasters can 
severely impact a community’s well-being though 
major infrastructure damage and severe financial 
losses, straining local health care and emergency 
response capabilities and severely affecting health 
and the environment.2,3 Health risks include 
illness, physical injury, potential disease outbreaks, 
exacerbation of chronic illness, mental health issues, 
and death.4
Epidemiology plays an integral role in disaster 
preparedness, response, and recovery activities. 
During disasters, public health surveillance can 
provide useful information for targeted and 
effective public health response.5-10 However, 
according to a study by the Disaster Epidemiology 
Subcommittee of the Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists (CSTE), the range of disaster 
surveillance activities conducted across U.S. states 
differ significantly.9 States varied in whether they 
had performed disaster surveillance in the past 10 
years, had included surveillance in their jurisdiction’s 
response plan, and had used exercises to test their 
surveillance systems. Those that had conducted 
disaster surveillance activities reported the need 
for flexible disaster surveillance response plans, key 
partnerships established, and staff trained and ready 
to support surveillance activities before an event.9 
This primer was developed to provide introductory 
information on the purpose, importance, and 
methods for approaching disaster surveillance in the 
U.S.
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The audience for this primer is public health 
departments at state, local, tribal, and territorial 
levels. This document outlines how health 
departments can approach public health 
surveillance during a disaster and reviews principles 
and practices of disaster surveillance. It provides 
key concepts and challenges to consider when 
conducting disaster surveillance, but does not give 
step-by-step guidance. 
The principles and practices described in this 
document can be useful for developing surveillance 
systems for disasters if existing systems do not exist, 




To mitigate adverse health effects and reduce future 
impacts from disasters, public health officials must 
respond with appropriate public health actions. 
Those might include conducting epidemiological 
studies or program development and 
implementation throughout the disaster life cycle 
(i.e., preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation). 
Timely and accurate information is required so that 
actions from policy decisions during the mitigation 
and preparedness phases, to resource allocation 
during the response phase and long-term assistance 
in the recovery phase is appropriate and effective. 
Disaster epidemiology plays a major role 
throughout the disaster life cycle in providing 
needed information. In simple terms, disaster 
epidemiology is the use of epidemiology to 
investigate the short- and long-term health effects of 
disasters and to predict the health consequences of 
future disasters.11 
Disaster surveillance is a tool in disaster 
epidemiology that  
•	 provides ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, 
and interpretation of injuries, illnesses, and 
deaths for use in planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practice;
•	 enables public health to track and identify 
morbidity and mortality linked to an event; and 
•	 provides insight into future disasters.12-14
Information collected from any surveillance system 
must serve to facilitate action, and therefore must 
be communicated to emergency managers, policy 
makers, public health staff, program leaders, and 
the public. Information can also be used to drive 
public health actions, target response activities, 
provide situational awareness, direct public 
communications, and address rumors.5-10,14,15 
Surveillance can be invaluable in understanding 
the totality of the disaster’s human health impacts. 
Surveillance systems provide data on health events 
resulting from the disaster that are analyzed to 
characterize those events by person, place, and 
time. This information helps to identify where public 
health problems are, who is affected, and where and 
how they are affected.16,17
Information collected from any surveillance system 
must serve to facilitate action.
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Purpose of Disaster Surveillance
When disasters occur, many questions will need 
to be answered. These include what public health 
problems are occurring, where and why they 
are occurring, who is impacted, and which are 
causing the greatest public health problems. 
Disaster surveillance is an effective way to address 
these questions. It provides public health staff 
and other decision makers with actionable health 
information.15 Disaster surveillance helps to
•	 define and detect outbreaks and health problems 
early on;
•	 determine when, where, and how injuries, illnesses, 
and deaths occur;
•	 prepare for and prevent ongoing adverse health 
effects; 
•	 estimate the magnitude of a health problem;
•	 identify at-risk groups or geographic areas;
•	 demonstrate the need for public health 
intervention or resources;
•	 inform and monitor the effectiveness of response 
and relief efforts; and
•	 assist with planning for future disasters and 
recommend ways to decrease the consequences of 
future disasters.14
For many conditions, surveillance is used to 
monitor and track morbidity (i.e., illness or disease) 
and mortality (i.e., fatalities) in a population or 
subset of a population, such as first responders.18 
Surveillance can track morbidity and mortality 
from communicable diseases such as norovirus and 
waterborne diseases, and chronic diseases such 
as diabetes and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD). Surveillance also might track injuries 
from carbon monoxide (CO) exposure, falls, and 
other causes; health consequences of exposure to 
chemicals and environmental contaminants; and 
behavioral and mental health issues. 
Without surveillance data, decision makers’ 
actions might not address the most urgent needs 
of the affected population. When implementing 
a disaster surveillance system, keep in mind 
that information must be promptly dispersed to 
health and government officials and emergency 
managers who are in a position to take action 
based on data-driven recommendations. This is the 
primary purpose of disaster surveillance: to provide 
timely, accurate, and relevant information to drive 
decisions and interventions during a disaster.12,19-22 
Surveillance also helps plan for future disasters. 
As issues are resolved and needs arise, continued 
disaster surveillance allows responders to track and 
redefine public health problems and priorities as 
the disaster progresses and moves to new phases.12 
Finally, disaster surveillance serves to highlight areas 
for future research and training, which will help 
jurisdictions better prepare for disasters.23 
Disaster surveillance helps to identify disaster-
related health problems; provides information to 
prevent or reduce injury, illness, or death; and helps 





Traditionally, surveillance systems are classified as 
passive or active. Passive surveillance is the regular 
reporting of disease data by health institutions to 
health authorities. In a passive surveillance system, 
there is no active search for cases, rather it involves 
passive notification by the health care facilities or 
practitioners.24 For example, hospitals, clinics, public 
health facilities, laboratories, and other sources 
report pre-determined notifiable diseases to state 
health departments due to legal state mandates.25 
This is the basis of notifiable disease surveillance in 
the U.S. The National Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
System (NNDSS) collects information on selected 
infectious and non-infectious diseases and 
conditions, such as salmonellosis, West Nile virus, 
and carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning that can be 
used as a data source during disasters.26 
Passive systems are useful beause they
•	 are relatively inexpensive, 
•	 are cost-effective to implement, 
•	 have a low data collection burden, and
•	 provide important information for monitoring a 
population’s health. 
Often data requested from passive systems are 
minimal. If a large area needs to be covered, passive 
surveillance may be used as a relatively inexpensive 
strategy. For example, following a widespread 
disaster, passive surveillance may be used to monitor 
vaccine-preventable disease occurrence, such as 
tetanus. However, because passive surveillance 
depends on health officials and procedures in 
different institutions to provide data, the quality 
and timeliness of those data are difficult to control.7 
Reporting can be slow, variable, or incomplete if the 
responsible health officials do not report regularly. 
Slow and irregular reporting are concerns in disaster 
situations where timely information is needed. These 
issues with passive systems might be compounded 
if the health care infrastructure is damaged or 
destroyed.27 
Active Surveillance
Active surveillance uses designated staff 
members to regularly contact heath care providers, 
laboratories, hospitals, the population, and others 
to seek information about health conditions. Active 
surveillance is often more sensitive and may collect 
information that is more detailed than passive 
system data since staff can search or request for 
specific information about cases.25
During disasters, epidemiologists may use active 
surveillance systems in addition to passive 
surveillance. After Hurricane Andrew, for example, 
the Louisiana Office of Public Health, in coordination 
with emergency departments, public utility 
personnel, and coroners, used active surveillance to 
facilitate health impact and outcome reporting in 
the affected areas.28 
Active surveillance is commonly used in disaster 
situations where tents, temporary shelters, mobile 
clinics, or other venues are established for short-
term medical care by response agencies such as 
Active systems are useful because they
•	 can complement regular reporting functions 
disrupted by the disaster;
•	 can be used in non-traditional settings, such 
as evacuation centers and temporary shelters, 
providing more flexibility than regular reporting 
mechanisms;
•	 can be targeted to determine the needs of 
special populations or identify groups, more at 
risk for adverse health events; and
•	  often provide more complete information than 
passive surveillance.  
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the American Red Cross and the military.7 Whether 
you use active, passive, or a combination of both is 
determined by the specific disaster situation and 
available resources. 
Although active surveillance provides the 
most accurate and timely information, it is also 
expensive and labor intensive. Resource scarcity 
in disaster settings and the cost of running active 
surveillance might limit its use to short periods 
and the investigation of specific health concerns.27 
Differences in format, methods of data collection, 
and reporting across sources also make it difficult to 
aggregate this information unless the surveillance 
system uses mechanisms such as standardized 
questionnaires to diminish such differences. 
Sentinel Surveillance 
Sentinel surveillance is an active or passive 
surveillance system that collects data from a 
limited number of recruited participants or 
providers to report on specific health events.29 The 
selected sample of reporting sources may serve to 
estimate trends in the larger affected population.7 
Sentinel surveillance providers may include clinics, 
hospitals, other health care facilities, laboratories, 
or physicians. Providers included in the sentinel 
surveillance system report all cases of the conditions 
of interest. 
 
Sentinel systems are useful because they 
•	 monitor trends effectively,
•	 overcomes issues of underreporting,
•	 monitor a greater number of conditions,27
•	 are less costly than other methods,7 and
•	 are flexible and can be scaled up by recruiting 
additional surveillance sites.
Sentinel surveillance can be established to 
supplement an existing surveillance system. 
After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, national and 
international agencies collaborated to form the 
National Sentinel Site Surveillance System to 
monitor disease trends, detect outbreaks, and 
characterize the affected population to target 
relief efforts to areas of need.30 Over the course of 3 
months, 51 selected hospital and clinic surveillance 
sites provided daily telephone or email reports for 25 
specified conditions. During that time the sentinel 
system did not pick up any anomalies, but was used 
as proof to dispel rumors about disease clusters and 
outbreaks.30
Although sentinel surveillance can be extremely 
useful for detecting large public health problems, 
it might not capture rare events, such as the early 
emergence of a new disease, which might occur 
in areas not covered in the sentinel surveillance 
system.7 The sentinel sites selected also might not be 
representative of the larger disaster-affected area, 
depending on how the sample is selected. 
Syndromic Surveillance
Syndromic surveillance is an active or passive 
system that uses case definitions or syndromes 
based on a group of signs and symptoms, primary 
complaints or presumptive diagnoses, or other 
characteristics of the disease, rather than specific 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic criteria. Data can 
be gathered from traditional surveillance sources, 
such as emergency rooms and physicians, or from 
non-traditional sources such as nurse hotlines 
and pharmacies.31 Each source included in the 
syndromic surveillance system reports any case 
matching the syndromes being monitored to the 
appropriate health authority. This process can be 
automated for quicker turnaround of information. 
In instances where the health infrastructure is 
maintained but increased timeliness is important, 
syndromic surveillance can supplement existing 
active or passive systems. In these situations, adding 
or monitoring specific syndromes, such as fever 
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and shortness of breath, in an existing surveillance 
system may ensure that you capture essential 
data.3 However, syndromic surveillance is often less 
specific and can be subject to misclassification. 
It might identify more people than actually have 
the condition of interest and might result in more 
complex data analyses and handling. For example, 
if a jurisdiction is interested in monitoring flu-like 
syndromes following a snowstorm, the number of 
true positives of influenza may be a much smaller 
number than the number of cases flagged by the 
syndromic surveillance system and would require 
additional data, such as laboratory confirmation, to 
monitor influenza trends. 
Syndromic systems are useful because they  
•	 are timely, providing early information and 
situational awareness, sometimes in near        
real time; 
•	 do not require health care practitioners to 
make diagnoses, which can be time consuming    
and difficult;
•	  do not require laboratory confirmation; and
•	  can detect outbreaks early on.
Syndromic surveillance is particularly useful in the 
early stages of a disaster if routine surveillance 
has been disrupted or has not been established. 
Flexibility and timely reporting are ideal. It can be 
used many ways, including situations where health 
effects are widespread, as in wildfires or hurricanes. 
It can be used to rule out an illness outbreak after 
a disaster or to detect and monitor health impacts 
that affect only a few individuals.8 In 2001, after the 
World Trade Center attacks, syndromic surveillance 
was established in New York to help quickly 
identifying potential outbreaks or illnesses that 
could be linked to a bioterrorist event.25 Syndromic 
surveillance provides early identification of potential 
morbidity and mortality because the system can 
identify potential cases from doctor or emergency 
department visits before a person’s condition 
is officially diagnosed.11 In areas particularly 
devastated by a disaster, syndromic surveillance 
provides an earlier indication of unusual increases in 
illnesses, injury, or death to shape early intervention 
efforts.
CDC’s National Syndromic Surveillance Program 
(NSSP) BioSense Platform is a public health 
surveillance system that increases the ability of 
health officials at local, state, and national levels to 
efficiently, rapidly, and collaboratively monitor and 
respond to harmful health effects of exposure to 
disease or hazardous conditions. The Platform gives 
users access to the data and technology to conduct 
syndromic surveillance to track health issues and 
rapidly share information with others in the system. 
After the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill, state 
and local jurisdictions coordinated with CDC and 
other federal agencies to use the BioSense Platform 
to monitor 21 conditions. The monitoring produced 
daily situational awareness reports for affected state 
and local responders.32 Another example, in 2007 
CDC personnel monitored data received by the 
Biossense Platform for evidence of health effects 
possibly related to wildfires in San Diego County, CA. 
Visits for diagnoses and chief complaints of asthma 
were all increased during the monitoring period.33
More information about the BioSense Platform 
and NSSP is available at http://www.cdc.gov/nssp/
biosense/index.html. 
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Surveillance during a Disaster
Disasater Data Types
Disaster surveillance is often defined by data types: 
morbidity and mortality. 
•	Morbidity is the state of being ill, diseased, or 
injured or the incidence or prevalence of illness or 
injury in a population.18 
•	Mortality is the incidence of death in a 
population.18 It is an important indicator of the 
gravity of a disaster. 
Detecting outbreaks of infectious disease such 
as gastrointestinal and respiratory illness after a 
disaster is crucial, especially when populations are 
displaced and sheltering in large groups. However, 
data collected after Hurricane Katrina and other 
major disasters show that health events in disasters 
are not limited to infectious diseases. Chronic illness, 
injury, and mental health outcomes can worsen and 
often play a larger role than communicable disease.17 
Therefore, surveillance systems need to monitor 
morbidity and mortality related to non-infectious 
conditions such as chronic disease, mental health 
issues, CO poisoning, and injury, especially focusing 
on at-risk populations (e.g., young children, pregnant 
women, elderly).17
Morbidity Surveillance
Disaster-related morbidity surveillance helps 
inform decisions about allocating resources, 
targeting interventions to meet specific needs, 
triggering public health response, and planning for 
future disasters.34 Morbidity surveillance collects 
information on  
•	 incidence rate, 
•	 prevalence rate, and 
•	 stratified rates (e.g., by age, sex, geographic 
location).
Mortality Surveillance 
The mortality (death) rate helps to measure the 
impact of a disaster on a population.19 It can assist in 
determining the magnitude of event-related health 
effects, evaluating prevention policy effectiveness, 
and identifying preventable disaster-related deaths.6 
Important mortality-related data to collect include
•	 demographic characteristics, 
•	 time and location of death, and 
•	 cause and manner of death. 
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Surveillance During a Disaster
During a disaster, data collection conditions are 
often chaotic and unpredictable. Surveillance is time 
and resource intensive, so use the most efficient 
method of reaching your objectives.35 
The preferred approach is to use preexisting 
surveillance data for baseline information and 
modify established epidemiologic surveillance 
systems for disaster settings. In the U.S., many 
existing public health infectious disease surveillance 
systems can be used or modified for use during a 
disaster. Many states also have systems to monitor 
non-infectious diseases and injuries, which might be 
beneficial.15 Examples of existing state surveillance 
systems include NCDETECT in North Carolina, 
ESSENCE in Florida, and SPARCS in New York.36-38
A supplemental or ad hoc surveillance system will 
be useful 
•	 if the area lacks a preexisting surveillance 
infrastructure, or
•	 in circumstances where populations are 
displaced and temporary health care facilities 
are established.  
Planning for Surveillance
Sometimes a surveillance system has not been 
created. Other times the existing surveillance 
systems are insufficient or have been compromised 
because the health infrastructure is severely 
damaged. In such situations, you might need to 
conduct supplemental surveillance, create a new 
system, or modify one that is available.7 
Whether you plan to use an existing surveillance 
system and supplement it as needed or you need 
to create a new system or modify an existing one, 
careful planning is important and should be done 
in the preparedness phase of the disaster cycle.21 
Determining priority conditions or indicators to 
monitor will help to ready jurisdictions to rapidly 
conduct disaster surveillance.17 Although no one 
approach fits all situations, key steps to help you 
develop a disaster surveillance system include the 
following:
•	 Define objectives
•	 Select variables for data collection 
•	 Determine data sources 
•	 Develop a data analysis approach
•	 Plan for report generation and results 
dissemination
Disaster surveillance is a fluid process. Outcomes 
from previous or current surveillance activities 
might affect the surveillance objectives and data 
collection, analysis, and dissemination.39 As with all 
disaster activities, surveillance should be flexible 
and adaptable and integrate lessons learned from 
previous experiences. Knowing how to adapt 
existing systems to your needs can help facilitate 
your disaster surveillance activities.
Define Objectives
Set clearly defined objectives for your system in 
the preparedness phase. A surveillance system 
may be more likely to collect the information you 
need to answer your questions if you create strong 
objectives early on. Failing to create clear objectives 
may result in collecting unnecessary information, 
wasting time and resources. The objectives describe 
how the surveillance information will be used to 
inform public health actions. 
Potentially useful objectives of a disaster surveillance 
system include the following:
•	 Monitoring the affected population’s health for a 
defined time period
•	 Estimating the magnitude of a health problem
•	 Tracking disease trends for early detection and 
outbreak control
•	 Identifying priority health needs, both immediate 
and long-term
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•	 Identifying causes of event-related injury and 
illness
•	 Tracking the geographic distribution of morbidity 
and mortality
•	 Focusing resources on groups that might be more 
vulnerable to disaster-related impacts and other 
disproportionately affected populations
•	 Evaluating public health actions and interventions
•	 Identifying research needs and evaluating control 
strategies5,19
Additionally, when defining your objectives, you 
should plan for which phase of a disaster you will 
implement surveillance and how your objectives 
may change as you shift from one phase to another. 
In the response phase, for example, the main priority 
of surveillance is to reduce morbidity and mortality 
rates. In contrast, an objective in the recovery phase 
may be to evaluate program interventions.19
After establishing the objectives, use them to 
limit your data collection and sites to the simplest 
possible solution that will meet the objectives. 
Consider data quantity versus timeliness and 
simplicity. You do not want to burden or overwhelm 
staff, therefore, collecting only the information that 
is absolutely needed is important.
Select Variables to Collect
After you have developed your objectives, you will 
need to select variables for data collection and 
establish case definitions. A case definition is a set 
of standard criteria for classifying whether a person 
has a particular disease, syndrome, or other health 
condition. Case definitions must be simple, clearly 
defined, understandable, and practical for use in a 
disaster setting. Generally, case definitions include 
criteria for person, place, and time.27 
During a disaster, time and resource constraints 
often will limit your case definitions to 
•	 simple clinical signs and symptoms, and
•	 a few common conditions.19 
For disaster surveillance, case definition criteria 
might differ from clinical criteria when diagnosing an 
illness, disease, or other health condition. You might 
be dependent on initial impressions, chief complaint, 
or a broad category of signs and symptoms (e.g., 
nausea, diarrhea, skin irritation, conjunctivitis) 
rather than laboratory results, discharge diagnosis, 
or other confirmatory information.5,25 You might 
need to make a trade-off between degree of 
certainty in diagnosis and timeliness of reporting. 
Common clinical signs and symptoms could include 
fever alone or in combination with sore throat or 
cough.40 Disaster surveillance often also includes 
noncommunicable conditions such as burns, 
chemical exposures, CO poisoning, physical trauma, 
and adverse mental health effects. 
When developing case definitions, consider both
•	direct health effects — caused by the disaster’s 
actual, physical forces, or essential elements (e.g., 
flooding from a hurricane or flying debris in a 
tornado), and
•	 indirect health effects — caused by unsafe 
or unhealthy conditions that develop from the 
effects of the disaster or events that occur from 
anticipating the disaster (e.g., motor vehicle 
accidents during mandatory evacuation).41
Without case definitions that account for both the 
direct and indirect effects of a disaster, surveillance 
data may be incomplete or may not accurately 
capture the health needs of the affected population. 
The information you collect will be limited by 
your available human and financial resources. The 
conditions and determinants under surveillance 
should not affect the system’s ability to operate 
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throughout the extent of the disaster.14 Remember 
to set your objectives and priorities for case 
definitions based on those considerations.  
 
To aid with timeliness and standardization, you 
ight use established case definitions such as 






Before creating a new form to collect data, try to 
find out what existing data sources are available.
Whether you are using or modifying an existing 
surveillance system or creating a supplemental 
or active surveillance system, the objectives and 
type of surveillance system will help determine 
the data source(s). Consider identifying existing 
potential data sources and establishing working 
relationships with partners during the preparedness 
phase. For example, if you are interested in mortality 
surveillance it would be helpful to reach out to your 
partners in vital statistics, funeral directors, medical 
examiners and coroners, and mass fatality staff 
to see their electronic death registration system 
(EDRS) capabilities. Additionally, nongovernmental 
organizations (e.g., American Red Cross) and federal 
agencies (e.g., FEMA) may be collecting mortality 
information that could supplement your existing 
efforts. 
Many sources for morbidity and mortality data are 
available. These include national and state-based 
reportable disease systems, electronic or paper 
hospital records, census data on vulnerability 
and health predictors, disease registries, and 
health surveys (e.g., National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey, Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System).15,17
Health Care Facilities
Hospital and other health care facility data can 
provide a look at morbidity and mortality for certain 
conditions that are attributed to a disaster to 
determine increases due to the event. Hospitals in 
the U.S. currently use the International Classification 
of Diseases, 10th revision, Clinical Modification 
(ICD-10-CM) codes to classify diseases and health 
issues. The ICD alpha numeric codes allow for 
morbidity and mortality data to be systematically 
classified, compiled, and compared.42 This coding 
enables searches for disaster-related ICD codes (e.g., 
X37 for cataclysmic storm, T58 for toxic effects of 
carbon monoxide) to gather morbidity and mortality 
surveillance data. 
 
The ICD-10 site can be accessed at                      
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/icd10/.
In the U.S., many hospitals and health care providers 
use electronic information systems, which are a 
potential source for large amounts of data. Electronic 
health records and exchanges are valuable data 
sources that can help address baseline and logistical 
constraints on data collection.15,43, 44
When electronic systems are not available, paper 
forms can be used to collect morbidity and mortality 
data. Using pre-created, validated, and standardized 
collection instruments is ideal in disaster situations. 
They save time and resources and may allow for 
cross-jurisdictional standardization for comparison 
and data aggregation.11 Abbreviated forms can 
be used if summary or less-detailed information 
is sufficient or when the burden of collecting 
detailed, individual information is substantial. CDC 
has developed multiple, ready-to-use templates 
for morbidity and mortality surveillance forms. You 
can use these templates to supplement existing 
surveillance, temporarily replace a system, or create 
an ad hoc surveillance system (e.g., in a shelter 
where no system previously existed).
You can access these surveillance templates on 
the CDC Emergency Preparedness and Response 
website (http://emergency.cdc.gov/disasters/
surveillance/).
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During a disaster, the Red Cross, if deployed, 
captures aggregate morbidity data, from their 
shelters onto a report form. Public health working 
with local chapters of Red Cross can develop 
information sharing protocols for such events. 
Although using existing data sources and forms is 
preferred, you may need to create new surveillance 
forms for some disaster circumstances (e.g., severe 
health care infrastructure disruption, persons 
seeking care outside typical acute care settings) or 
when no forms or existing data sources are available 
to meet your surveillance objectives.17
Ideally, surveillance forms will be developed, tested, 
and distributed before a disaster. However, you 
might need to modify them depending on factors 
such as disaster type, available resources, and 
surveillance site. The forms should be easy to use 
and only collect the most essential information to 
simplify data entry. 
Vital Statistics
Vital statistics (i.e., death records) are the gold 
standard for mortality surveillance. They provide 
data on demographic characteristics, geographic 
location, and cause of death. However, death record 
data can take months to obtain and might be of 
limited use in the response phase. Electronic death 
registration systems (EDRS) have been established 
in 38 of the 57 vital statistics jurisdictions in the U.S. 
EDRS allow for electronic filing of death certificates 
anywhere that has Internet access. They provide 
timely data in a more standardized manner that 
can be shared across jurisdictions and with federal 
agencies.45 
To facilitate inter-jurisdictional data exchange, the 
National Association for Public Health Statistics 
and Information Systems developed the State and 
Territorial Exchange of Vital Events (STEVE) system. 
Jurisdictions and federal agencies can use this 
messaging application to electronically exchange 
vital event data such as death certificates.45 
Electronic recording and sharing of death data can 
potentially provide a useful, timely, and streamlined 
source of baseline and event specific mortality 
surveillance data collected from various agencies 
and jurisdictions (e.g., Red Cross, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], state emergency 
operation centers). 
You will face various challenges in using EDRS for 
disaster-related mortality surveillance. Some of these 
include a lack of standardized cause of death entry 
and coding, missing data on disaster-relatedness 
in a death entry, and limitations on the search 
capabilities within the system. Timely reporting 
and high quality information on cause of death and 
injury are required for EDRS to be beneficial in a 
disaster.46 When collecting morbidity and mortality 
data, it helps to have the death certificate flagged as 
disaster-related so the record can be retrieved and 
tracked. It also helps to work with your local medical 
examiners or coroners during the preparedness 
phase to enlist their aid in the identification and 
reporting of all disaster-related deaths. CDC’s 
“Reference Guide for Certification of Deaths in the 
Event of a Disaster” has information to help you with 
in this process.    
Poison Centers
Poison centers (PCs) are a useful source of 
information on chemical exposures and poisonings 
related to disasters. PCs can provide background 
data and situational awareness by helping to 
monitor and detect outbreaks and trends and track 
disaster-related exposures, among other activities.43 
A network of 55 regional PCs services all parts 
of the country and U.S. territories through one 
national hotline number. Data collected from calls 
to PCs are uploaded into the National Poison Data 
System (NPDS). NPDS is a near-real time, national 
electronic data repository and web-based public 
health surveillance system. CDC uses NPDS data 
for surveillance of disaster-related exposures and 
associated illnesses (e.g., CO poisoning, foodborne 
outbreak). During a disaster, PCs can flag calls related 
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to the event with a code based on a predetermined 
case definition or inclusion criteria. This allows for 
easy, systematic tracking of all event-related calls.43 
At the national or regional level, PC data can be used 
to indicate
•	 the extent of toxic exposures related to the disaster 
through call frequencies over time, 
•	 the basic demographic distribution of 
toxic exposures related to the disaster and 
potential vulnerable populations who may be 
disproportionately affected, 
•	 health communication messaging needs of the 
affected population, and 
•	 the severity of toxic exposures and illness related 
to the disaster through a medical outcome 
measure used by all PCs.47 
Local and state public health personnel can also 
leverage this data to supplement existing disaster 
surveillance systems (e.g., to track CO exposure 
during disasters). At the local level, public health 
agencies can use this information for event mapping 
down to the zip code level, or case-finding of high 
priority exposures related to the disaster. You should 
establish partnerships with PCs before a disaster to 
provide for effective surveillance at the local level. 
Such partnerships can help local and state public 
health collaborate with PCs to access and use their 
data and technology to conduct public health 
disaster surveillance activities.43  
Affected Workers
In addition to the general public, health care and 
response workers can be affected by injury or illness 
during disasters, especially emergency responders, 
who often have the highest exposures. CSTE and 
CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) have a number of resources available 
for assessing worker health effects and exposures. 
CSTE’s Occupational Health Subcommittee is a useful 
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resource (http://www.cste.org/members/group.
aspx?id=106606).  Each state has an occupational 
safety and health contact (http://www.cdc.gov/
niosh/statosh.html).  NIOSH also has occupational 
health surveillance resources (http://www.cdc.gov/
niosh/topics/surveillance/). 
For assessing emergency responders, The 
Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and 
Surveillance (ERHMS) system is a multi-agency 
health monitoring and surveillance framework that 
includes recommendations and tools for protecting 
emergency responders. This tool can help identify 
potential exposures and detect and address health 
issues relief and response workers that may arise 
from their work. 




Nontraditional sources of surveillance information 
that can be useful include news and media outlets. 
Unstructured data from these sources include 
information that is not part of an organized 
database designed to be quantitatively analyzed.23 
Access to data (e.g., media reports of disaster-
related mortality) on the Internet is widespread 
and can help with timely detection of health events 
and more complete situational awareness. During 
Hurricane Sandy, for example, CDC evaluated 
the usefulness and accuracy of online media 
reports for disaster-related mortality surveillance. 
Epidemiologists used key word searches to track 
media reports in the affected region for Sandy-
related deaths and to obtain demographics and 
circumstance of death. Data from the online media 
reports provided timely information on disaster-
related mortality and could serve as a supplemental 
source of data in disasters.48 Additionally, memorial 
websites posted after mass fatality events might list 
mortality data, and social media sites may identify 
morbidity trends or outbreaks.19-51 These types of 
data may have lower specificity and reliability, but 
they can be valuable in a disaster situation where 
timely information is key. They can provide valuable 
information to supplement data gathered through 
more traditional sources such as public health and 
health care providers.23
14
Analyzing DataDevelop a  Analysis Approach
After having gathered the surveillance data, you 
want to analyze it by person, place, and time.14 
In disaster situations, you will want to conduct 
analysis and reporting frequently to quickly and 
effectively identify potential health issues and 
transmit that information to decision makers so 
they can implement timely interventions.19,52 During 
the response phase, daily analysis and reporting 
is encouraged.52 As the disaster progresses and 
surveillance needs shift or surveillance reverts 
back to more passive systems, you may consider 
transitioning to weekly or more infrequent 
analysis. In the preparedness phase, determine 
the appropriate analytic approach. Consider the 
technical capacity available for analysis, level of 
analysis complexity, and how frequently you will 
tabulate data.14,27 Data analysis is driven by your 
surveillance system’s purpose and design.53 
Descriptive analyses are useful in disaster situations 
because they are often simple, quick to calculate, 
and provide information for concrete public health 
action in an understandable manner. This approach 
involves calculating rates and identifying high-risk 
population groups. It involves answering questions 
of person, place, and time, such as “How much injury 
is occurring in a population?” and “Is one part of the 
population more negatively affected by the disaster 
than another?”12,25,27 For unexpected results, you 
can conduct more in-depth analysis or research to 
identify factors contributing to those outcomes.53 
For example, Alabama and Texas analyzed morbidity 
and mortality data focusing on carbon monoxide 
exposure following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
in 2005.  After conducting general descriptive 
statistics, they conducted more in-depth data 
analysis on specific results, including determining 
correlation between generator placement and 
carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) levels found in 
patients.54 
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Additionally, the Sphere Project* recommends 
stratifying data based on sex, age, individual 
vulnerability, affected and host populations, 
and context (e.g., shelter and non-shelter) when 
possible.55 After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 
epidemiologists stratified data from the sentinel 
surveillance system by location, identifying the 
regions which accounted for a majority of reported 
conditions, as well as by age, identifying the 
morbidity of those under 5 years of age.30 It might 
also help to disaggregate by community member 
and response or relief workers. Stratifying data in this 
manner can help to identify potentially vulnerable 
groups and those disproportionately affected by the 
disaster. It can also help identify the occurrence of 
morbidity and mortality during the disaster. Relief 
workers and community members may be affected 
by the same disaster differently because their roles 
and exposures may differ.56,57 However, detailed 
disaggregation may be difficult during the early 
stages of a disaster. 
Frequencies
Common and useful measures for analyzing injury or 
illness frequency include incidence and prevalence.53 
Incidence measures the occurrence of new cases of 
death, disease, or injury in a population. Prevalence 
measures the existing cases of death, disease, or 
injury .19,53 When providing case counts, clearly 
define whether the counts are related to new 
(incident) cases or current (prevalent) cases in the 
period.  
Incident cases or prevalence counts are usually 
simple and easy to understand. They can be useful 
for identifying clusters of disease and for health 
planning. An example is identifying needs, such as 
the number of beds or doses of vaccine required in 
a shelter.25 However, counts alone may not provide 
all of the information needed nor allow you to 
compare events in population groups of differing 
sizes or in different locations.19 For example, you 
cannot compare the 10 cases of illness in one 
shelter to the 20 cases of illness in another shelter 
without knowing the population of each shelter. As 
a shelter’s population fluctuates widely, a system 
(e.g., “heads in beds”) can help keep track of the 
denominator as the response situation evolves. For 
surveillance data to be useful, case counts must 
be related to the population size.25 You can do this 
by calculating incidence, prevalence, and other 
morbidity and mortality rates.19,25 
Rates are measures of risk that allow you to compare 
the frequency of morbidity and mortality in different 
places, times, or population groups.25 Usually, a 
calculation of the number of cases and rates includes 
a description of the population (person), location 
(place), and the period (time) for the condition.25 
•	 You could analyze data by person to identify 
subgroups (e.g., age, sex) that may be at increased 
risk for negative health outcomes by comparing 
instances of morbidity and mortality in various 
groups (e.g., general population, women, children, 
disabled, elderly). 
•	 You could analyze data by place by adjusting for 
differences in the size of the population in the 
assigned geographic areas. For instance, you could 
compare rates of injury in the disaster affected 
population to the rates occurring in a non-disaster 
affected population in the same region. 
•	 You could analyze data by time to describe trends 
and detect changes in disease occurrence or 
frequency. This can help determine if you have 
an outbreak of diarrheal illness in a shelter or if 
death among children younger than 5 years have 
increased as a result of the disaster.25 
* The Sphere Project is a multi-agency, nongovernmental organization 
initiative to improve humanitarian actions during disaster response. The 
Sphere Handbook presents a Humanitarian Charter and a set of minimum 
standards for humanitarian response to disasters. It provides concepts for 
planning, implementation, monitor, and evaluation in responses and supports 
disaster preparedness activities and contingency planning. More information is 
available at  http://www.spherehandbook.org/.
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For example, after Hurricane Opal, surveillance data 
for 20 conditions were analyzed by time, comparing 
the proportional morbidity rates of ED visits for 
these conditions for 6 days after the hurricane 
to the ED visits 6 days before the hurricane.58 
Although calculating rates such as these can be 
beneficial, denominator or baseline data may not be 
available to make these calculations in the disaster 
setting. Analysis may then be limited to calculating 
incident cases or prevalence only.  Basic analysis 
such as providing incidence or prevalence rates is 
commonly done in surveillance and provides a quick 
picture of what is going on in the field.59,60 
The analysis you conduct depends on the objectives 
of your surveillance and the design of your system, 
as well as the availability of resources. Table 1 
lists some common parameters for analyzing 
morbidity and mortality surveillance data in disaster 
situations.19,55
Before data analysis, consider the audience for 
your information and how you will present this 
information to them. By drafting your table shells 
early on, you will be prepared to insert your results 
into the shells for quick reporting turnaround. 
Monitoring Anomalies
When interpreting your surveillance data, first 
think of the limitations of your information and of 
the specific type of surveillance system and data 
collection methods used. Different systems have 
inherent strengths and weaknesses; be familiar with 
those before analyzing and interpreting your data.53 
Doing so will help you determine whether any 
anomalies in data patterns are the result of bias (e.g., 
recall, sampling) or are important health events that 
need to be addressed. In addition, you want to keep 
in mind the objectives of your surveillance system 
and key questions you are trying to address. Other 
useful questions to consider when monitoring for 
anomalies include the following:
•	 What are potential areas where you expect an 
increase in frequency of reports? 
•	 What are the alert thresholds or signal detection 
levels for your surveillance system?
•	 Is there an increase in frequency of a reported 
health condition? If so, is it related to the disaster 
and does this increase signify a need for response?
•	 Are cases clustered by time or geographic 
location?
•	 Have there been any changes to surveillance 
system or data collection over time?53 
Monitoring for anomalies in your surveillance data 
will help determine whether or not public health 
action is required. For example, a spike in the 
incidence and 30-day mortality from myocardial 
infarctions and stroke were found after Hurricane 
Sandy in New Jersey.61 To help interpret your 
surveillance data and make decisions, the Sphere 
Project recommends using supplementary data 
from other sources (e.g., surveys, baseline data, 
BRFSS, NHANES, health department surveys).55 If 
the expertise and resources are available, consider 
building algorithms into the surveillance system 
and analysis to identify statistical anomalies in the 
data.  However, this may not be practical for disaster 
situations.62 To better detect anomalies, it may be 
helpful to analyze certain data more frequently in 
the initial phases of a disaster.53 This can provide a 
more immediate picture of the ongoing changes in 
morbidity and mortality in the affected population. 
It also might reveal biases in the data that need to 
be investigated.
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Counts Incident cases† The occurrence of new cases of death, disease, or injury in a 
population over a specified period
Prevalent cases† The existing cases of death, disease, or injury in a population 
over a specified period
Morbidity and 
mortality rates
Incidence rate (new 
cases)‡
The number of new cases of a disease or injury that occur 
during a specified period per unit of person-time at risk (can be 
stratified by age and sex)
Prevalence or 
prevalence rate (total 
existing cases)†
The proportion of people in a population who have a particular 
health condition at a specified point in time or over a specified 
period
Crude mortality rate 
(CMR)‡
The rate of death in the entire population (includes all people, 
regardless of sex or age)
Cause-specific 
mortality rate§




rate (<5 years, >5 
years)‡
A mortality/morbidity rate limited to a particular age group 
(e.g., under-5 mortality rate [U5MR] is the rate of death among 
children younger than 5 years in a population)
Incidence proportion 
(attack rate, generally 
used for infectious 
conditions)†
The proportion of an initially disease-free population that 




The proportion of all deaths/new or existing cases in a specified 
population over a period attributable to a specific cause
Case fatality rate 
(CFR)‡
The proportion of people with a health condition in a specified 





The number of outpatient visits per person per year (if it is 
possible, distinguish between new and old visits and use new 




The average number of total consultations (new and repeat 
cases) seen by each clinician  per day
† CDC 2012c 
‡ The Sphere Project 2011 
§ Abdallah and Panjabi 2008
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Plan for Report Generation and 
Results Dissemination
Information gathered from the surveillance system 
is most useful if quickly shared with stakeholders to 
use for public health action.7,12 You should identify 
stakeholders during the preparedness phase. They 
may include public health agencies, government 
officials, relief and response workers, the affected 
community, and the media. Establishing reporting 
and communication plans during the preparedness 
phase helps ensure this information is transmitted 
appropriately. The format in which results are 
presented will depend on your audience. In general, 
provide results in a clear and concise manner that 
can be understood by nontechnical audiences.12,19,35 
When communicating or reporting data, include the 
following:
•	 Sources of data, including potential limitations
•	 Your findings
•	  The meaning or interpretation of the findings
•	  Actions to take63
 
Decision makers, stakeholders, and partners at all 
levels must understand the data results so they 
can readily act on the recommendations your data 
support. Evidence-based reports provide details to 
support those actions, but a summary statement 
can help provide focus. That statement, a single 
overriding communication objective (SOCO), 
provides actionable items based on the data.63 In 
short, make sure that you communicate a clear 
public health message rather than simply relaying 
data.14 The SOCO provides a response for the 
following questions: 
•	 What is new?
•	  Who is affected?
•	  What works best?63
 
Graphs, tables, and maps are useful tools that assist 
in rapid data review and comprehension.12,7,19 When 
creating visuals, ensure they are simple and clear so 
they are easier to understand. Epidemic (epi) curves 
can be created to give a visual display of the onset 
of health problems associated with the disaster. The 
epi curve displays the time trend or distribution 
over time, pattern of spread, outliers, scope, and 
magnitude of health problem.64 
Finally, make sure that all stakeholders receive your 
surveillance summary reports. Before you implement 
a surveillance system, determine your reporting 
protocol. Decide who will receive information and 
how often you will report surveillance results to your 
stakeholders. Examples of mechanisms for sharing 
your information include 
•	 daily or weekly summary reports (e.g., emergency 
operation center situational reports) and
•	  in-depth briefing meetings. 
 
After the disaster has transitioned to the mitigation 
phase, publishing your surveillance results in journal 
articles or other documentation is important so 
others can benefit from the lessons you have learned 
from the disaster. 
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Challenges of Surveillance in Disasters
Disasters are often challenging situations, even 
when the response is well planned, understand 
the issues that complicate surveillance in disaster 
situations. Disaster surveillance challenges discussed 
in this section include timing constraints, competing 
priorities, missing baseline data, difficulty obtaining 
denominator data, lack of standardized data 
collection and reporting, lack of representative 
information and underreporting, resource 
considerations, and infrastructure damage.
Surveillance challenges in disaster situations 
include the following:
•	  Time constraints
•	  Competing priorities
•	  Missing baseline data
•	  Difficulty obtaining denominator data
•	  Lack of standardized data collection and 
reporting 





Timely information is a key component in 
responding effectively to disasters. Without 
timely data, it becomes more difficult to detect 
and address public health issues present during 
a disaster. Data must be collected and analyzed 
rapidly, under challenging conditions, with forces 
outside your control impeding efforts to perform 
disaster-related morbidity and mortality surveillance. 
Because disasters often have a sudden onset, 
quickly implementing a system is difficult, unless 
one is already in place.21 Timeliness differs in various 
stages of the disaster. In the response phase of a 
disaster, for example, time and resources for data 
collection, analysis, and reporting are often limited.19 
In contrast, more time may be available to conduct 
more comprehensive surveillance in the recovery 
phase.
Keep in mind that setting up flexible surveillance 
systems in advance or building surveillance systems 
into existing infrastructure using existing systems, 
partnerships, and resources allows you to implement 
disaster surveillance more swiftly during a disaster 
response.15 Surveillance activities that rely on 
existing systems function more smoothly because 
the capacity to collect and analyze data is already in 
practice. During the response phase of a disaster you 
may end up collecting and analyzing a wide range 
of unnecessary data. You can minimize wasted time 
and effort by prioritizing the indicators collected 
based on what is most essential and practical for 
use.19 
Competing Priorities
During a disaster, the various stakeholders 
have differing and often competing priorities. 
Government agencies may focus on restoring 
infrastructure, whereas health agencies work to 
provide medical care. Differing priorities can affect 
resource availability for surveillance. Prioritizing data 
and information needs and tailoring indicators to 
the disaster phase, type of disaster, and potential 
impacts of the disaster will be important.5
Begin with clear surveillance objectives. This will 
also help you prioritize necessary information that 
will be collected by the surveillance system and 
facilitate decision making. Establishing cross-agency 
coordination (e.g., between disaster management 
officials and departments of health) will streamline 




You need baseline health information to determine 
if you have a true increase in a disease or worsening 
health status in the affected population and to 
assess population risk and vulnerability.5 However, 
the needed data are often missing or non-existent. 
This can occur when large portions of the population 
are displaced, the health care infrastructure is 
severely damaged, or no previous surveillance 
system collected the information you need. 
Baseline health information is available from 
multiple sources. These include previously 
established surveillance systems, such as the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. 
Published data are also available from CDC WONDER, 
the Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting 
System (WISQARS), census records, and surveys.14,65
Difficulty Obtaining Denominator Data
Gathering denominator data to calculate rates 
of morbidity and mortality also may be difficult. 
The population under surveillance may change 
frequently and residents may have evacuated 
an area or been displaced. Traditional census or 
population data may not adequately reflect the 
current population in the affected area. As a result, 
the population denominator may not be accurate 
or stable.65 Alternative sources of denominator 
data include shelter population counts, hospital 
admissions, and special surveys or assessments 
during the disaster.  
Lack of Standardization in Data Collection and 
Reporting
The need to collect information across multiple 
sites is challenging, especially if data collection and 
reporting are not standardized. Aggregating data 
across jurisdictions is important to target disaster 
response and relief, implement interventions, and 
evaluate intervention effectiveness.3,5
Ideally, data collection and reporting will be 
standardized during the preparedness phase. The 
process should be simple, flexible, and acceptable 
to the multiple organizations operating the 
surveillance system and using the results.
Pre-existing standardized surveillance templates 
and case definitions are available for use (http://
emergency.cdc.gov/disasters/surveillance/).5
Lack of Representative Information and 
Underreporting
When underreporting occurs, the surveillance 
system may not be representative or may fail to 
identify significant health issues.27 During disasters, 
underreporting can be a significant hurdle. Even in 
non-disaster circumstances, you may see substantial 
underreporting of cases. This is especially true for 
illnesses that are difficult to diagnose and where 
case definitions are overly complex. Logistical 
challenges, misconceptions about the need for 
surveillance, and a lack of disaster surveillance 
specific training can also lead to underreporting. 
The timing, location, and methodology of your 
data collection might affect how representative the 
data are of the affected population. For instance, 
information gathered from surveillance in facilities 
such as shelters or emergency clinics may not be 
representative of the larger population. The data 
gathered will instead represent the populations 
present in those locations, but not the larger 
affected geographic area.5,65
Having health care workers familiar with disaster 
surveillance, and a simple and efficient surveillance 
system for data collection, can help address these 
issues. Remember that a lack of reporting does 
not mean the absence of morbidity and mortality. 
Similarly, do not assume an increase in reporting 
represents an actual increase in cases. When 
reporting data, remember to take into account these 
considerations and any potential biases in results.5,65 
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Resource Considerations
Some of the direct and indirect costs related to 
surveillance include 
•	  data collection, entry, management, and analysis; 
•	 information dissemination; 
•	 staff time, investment, and travel; and 
•	 collecting, testing, and, transporting specimens 
(e.g., environmental samples, laboratory case 
confirmations).20 
Conducting surveillance may be considered too 
costly if it takes resources from other response 
and relief efforts.5 Design surveillance systems to 
minimize their cost and burden, while still meeting 
identified information needs.27 This may involve 
determining trade-offs between the cost of data 
collection and the value of the information. Try 
to limit data collection to only the most essential 
information and use the least labor-intensive 
method possible that still maintains the needed 
quality, scope, and detail to meet your objectives.14 
Creating strong objectives, using an existing 
surveillance system, and educating stakeholders 
about the value of surveillance may also help 
to sway decision makers to conduct disaster 
surveillance.5
Infrastructure Damage
Disasters can severely damage or destroy local 
hospitals and health care systems. When that 
happens, health care services are interrupted or 
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limited and established health care surveillance 
systems (e.g., hospital surveillance) may stop 
working. In such instances, outside relief and health 
organizations, such as the American Red Cross, 
provide temporary medical assistance and care, but 
they may not have the same surveillance capacity 
as hospitals. Additionally, the few operating medical 
care facilities are likely to be overwhelmed and 
unable to conduct surveillance. 
The disaster setting also presents logistical 
problems or obstacles to surveillance. For example, 
power and telephone outages may disrupt 
communication networks. Damaged or destroyed 
roads or transportation systems may slow or stop 
data collection. Such problems interrupt the usual 
reporting mechanisms, leading to an underreporting 
of health events. Infrastructure damage and illness 
and injury among health care workers may keep 
them from responding to a disaster and conducting 
surveillance. In these cases, alternative or outside 
volunteers with limited surveillance experience may 
be trained for the specific event and used. This could 
affect data collection quality.5 
During times of damaged or destroyed 
infrastructure, working within your incident 
management system (IMS) is beneficial to aid with 
resources, logistics, and coordination. Flexibility 
is also important. You may need to use pencil 
and paper to collect data if electronic recording 
is unavailable. You also may need to conduct 
surveillance activities from a location other than 
your health department. Think about creative ways 
to gain information from resources not affected by 
the disaster. For example, satellite imagery, such 
as the overhead photos of the tsunami area in the 
Indian Ocean, can be used to identify the extent 
of a disaster. FEMA or the Army Corps of Engineers 
may also have estimates of damage. For damaged 
healthcare systems, working with temporary 
onsite healthcare providers (e.g., American Red 
Cross), outside workers trained in surveillance, and 
community leaders to collect data is a potential 
solution.5,65 
Disaster surveillance has many uses, but data must 
be collected rapidly under less than ideal conditions. 
The data must be compiled quickly and in a logical 
format. Various forces outside of your control also 
might limit or prevent you from performing disaster-
related morbidity and mortality surveillance. A 
lesson learned from conducting public health 
surveillance of Hurricane Katrina evacuees was the 
need to establish surveillance systems and federal, 
state, and local partnerships before a disaster 
occurs.3
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Key Considerations in Conducting 
Surveillance
Disasters are unpredictable and do not uniformly 
affect all areas. Because public health action in 
disasters often occurs at the local level, surveillance 
systems need to be flexible and adaptable to the 
needs at hand. As you plan disaster surveillance 
activities, consider whether your existing or 
proposed system includes those characteristics. To 
prevent complicating the system and overtaxing 
scarce resources, consider limiting the number of 
conditions under surveillance to those most relevan
to your situation’s objectives.
Answering the following questions can help 
you anticipate and address some of the unique 
difficulties you may face as a result of the 




Are your existing systems flexible and can you 
adapt them?
Choosing an appropriate strategy for surveillance 
will depend on what systems and other health and 
data collection resources are already present in an 
area.20 Before setting up a new, ad hoc surveillance 
system, check whether any existing systems are 
available that will meet your information needs or 
that can be modified to address disaster information 
gaps. Typically, existing surveillance systems 
will need to be modified. More than half of the 
jurisdictions that reported conducting disaster 
surveillance activities in the past 10 years required 
modifications to meet disaster needs.9 Surveillance 
systems also need to be flexible and easily 
adaptable.9
Working with existing surveillance resources has 
many benefits. By using or modifying an existing 
system, you eliminate the need to develop a 
surveillance system from scratch, saving time and 
resources that are often severely limited in disaster 
situations. In addition, health workers will not need 
to be retrained to use a new surveillance system. 
They will be familiar enough with the existing 
systems to easily adapt to small modifications in data 
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reporting or collection methodology. Health care 
workers experienced in using the systems can aid 
and instruct field responders who are less familiar 
with the system. This helps ensure data collection 
and reporting quality. Finally, using existing 
surveillance systems allows for data that are more 
easily compared with those collected in non-disaster 
surveillance, providing a baseline for comparisons.
If using or modifying an existing system is not 
an option, consider creating one that has the 
flexibility and potential to continue to be useful 
beyond the disaster. Such a system can be used to 
both conduct disaster surveillance and help build 
surveillance capacity in an area that may have lacked 
it previously. Disaster surveillance forms can be 
created during the preparedness phase and then 
used or modified to meet the specific needs of your 
situation. As noted previously, CDC has developed 
standardized morbidity and mortality forms that can 
be modified to suit your needs.
You can access those forms at                               
http://emergency.cdc.gov/disasters/surveillance/.
What are the start and stop triggers/thresholds?
When planning your disaster surveillance system, 
knowing when to start surveillance, what factors 
will trigger investigations, and when to stop 
disaster surveillance activities is useful. Knowing 
your thresholds will help systematically start and 
stop your investigation at the appropriate times. 
These thresholds will vary depending on a disaster’s 
severity and scope. Some triggers for starting 
disaster surveillance include the following: 
•	 Information needs (e.g., suspected outbreaks of 
infectious disease, reports of high rates of mental 
illness, controlling rumors)
•	 Impact on the population (e.g., whether or not 
people have been displaced or are in shelters)
•	 Resource availability (e.g., status of the public 
health and health care infrastructure, capacity to 
conduct surveillance)
•	 Opening of multiple or long-term evacuation 
shelters (e.g., whether or not people have been 
displaced or are in shelters, potential for spread of 
illness)     
Be flexible during a disaster and know when to 
prioritize your actions. For instance, if you are unable 
to conduct surveillance in every shelter opened 
during a hurricane response, you could potentially 
prioritize them by size, how long they will be open, 
or population movement into and out of the facility. 
Plan for stopping surveillance or transitioning back 
to more routine surveillance systems. Defining the 
span of time an initial surveillance system will cover 
is useful for determining when surveillance should 
stop. At the end of the predetermined time, the data 
gathered from a surveillance system can be assessed 
to determine whether surveillance activities need 
to be extended.25 Factors relating to the event itself 
or the affected populations could signal a good 
stopping or transitioning point. For instance, when 
people begin returning to their homes, shelter 
surveillance may no longer be necessary or relevant. 
However, in instances where the extent of the 
damage and level of displacement persist for an 
extended period, surveillance activities may need to 
be continued for a longer time span. For example, 
mortality rates remained elevated long after 
Hurricane Katrina passed, and high rates of chronic 
illness and morbidity continued for years after the 
storm.65-6 In most circumstances, after a situation 
has become more stable, routine surveillance is 
functional again, or information needs have shifted, 
you will work to transition out of surveillance entirely 
or back to a passive system.
Can existing surveillance forms capture disaster-
relatedness?
Even when your jurisdiction is not directly affected 
by a disaster, large-scale events elsewhere can 
result in short- and long-term displacement of 
affected populations across the country. Having data 
collection instruments that can flag disaster-related 
health effects will be valuable for tracking victims 
no matter where they disperse. For instance, after 
Hurricane Katrina many evacuees were sheltered 
in Colorado where the state conducted health 
surveillance on evacuees, notifying emergency 
departments to identify and report evacuee visits 
through a Health Alert Network (HAN) message.67 
Including a way to flag disaster-relatedness on 
forms such as death certificates can also help to 
address some of the challenges related to using 
EDRS as surveillance for disaster-related mortality.45 
Medical examiners, coroners, physicians, and others 
participating in routine surveillance or working with 
surveillance forms and other certificates of morbidity 
and mortality should be given guidance and training 
on recording and certifying disaster-related deaths 
so that this process is done in a standardized 
manner. 
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Who are the relevant stakeholders?
As part of surveillance planning, you should identify 
the relevant stakeholders. This includes persons 
who requested the surveillance or information, field 
responders, emergency managers, officials across 
multiple disciplines and levels of government, 
non-governmental organizations, data providers, 
and those funding your surveillance activities. 
Partnerships and collaboration are key to a 
successful surveillance system; establish them before 
a disaster occurs.39 Stakeholders will also determine 
the information needs of a situation and access to 
available types of resources. Each health care setting 
may have a distinct data reporting style and various 
information needs.3  
In working with government officials, health 
care organizations, relief agencies, and other 
stakeholders and partners, take into account the 
political, financial, and human resources needed 
to successfully implement a disaster surveillance 
system. Having the support of high ranking 
government officials is important to ensure political 
commitment and funding to mobilize resources.7 
Similarly, federal, state, and local partnerships may 
help provide coordination capacity and financial and 
other resources.  
How is surveillance information going to be 
used?
Before conducting surveillance, you should know 
how the information you are collecting is going to 
be used. Are you characterizing disease or injury 
in the displaced population? Are you interested in 
looking at mental health issues? Are you monitoring 
for outbreaks of infectious disease in shelter 
populations or gastrointestinal illness in flooded 
areas? Knowing why you are collecting information 
will help to determine your surveillance strategy 
and will guide development of your objectives. If 
surveillance information will be used to monitor 
disaster-associated reproductive health impacts, for 
example, you will include these in your objectives 
and include questions or components in your 
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reporting system for pregnancy and other related 
factors.
What information do you have about the affected 
population?
As part of the planning and preparation process, 
gather background data on the geographic areas 
that may be affected by a disaster, the major disease 
risks in those areas (e.g., vector-borne illness, high 
dependence on supplemental oxygen), and the at-
risk and affected populations. 
To help identify at-risk groups in your population, 
you can use tools available online from CDC at                       
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/hsb/disaster/
atriskguidance.pdf, http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/
cdc/7552, and http://svi.cdc.gov/. 
The scope of a surveillance system, including the 
geographic area and population covered, can be 
narrowed using background information.25 For 
instance, looking at high risk areas for flooding or 
earthquakes helps you narrow the geographic area 
within which you conduct surveillance.21 Background 
information helps you determine the extent of your 
surveillance system. The information may indicate 
a need for universal coverage, where an entire 
population or representative sample is selected to 
conduct surveillance for the condition of interest 
(e.g., food poisoning, bioterrorism agents). Perhaps, 
instead, you could use a system in which sentinel 
sites (e.g., a few hospitals in an oil spill impact area), 
or health care providers are selected. In addition to 
information provided by the health system, relief 
workers, and local community groups, consider 
gathering information from unconventional sources 
such as newspapers, the Internet, or social media, 
which can provide important early warnings.68 
Background information focuses your efforts. It helps 
you avoid gathering unnecessary data and wasting 
limited resources.
What issues of security and confidentiality need 
to be considered?
Ideally, potential security issues and confidentiality 
concerns are addressed in the planning phase. 
The ability to protect patient information will 
vary with the policies, regulations, and statutes in 
your jurisdiction. Consider issues resulting from 
having small numbers of cases that could result 
in patient identification, even if names, addresses, 
and other personal identification information are 
protected or not collected. Consider how you can 
maintain confidentiality for organizations and those 
reporting to the surveillance system. For example, 
the need to name particular locations should be 
balanced against the negative effects of naming 
those locations. Public health organizations should 
be familiar with their institutional review board 
policies to determine whether review and approval 
or exemption is required before developing the 
surveillance system.
What phase of the disaster is it?
Finally, knowing what phase of the disaster you need 
to or plan to implement surveillance in will affect 
the goals and objectives of your surveillance. In the 
response phase, for example,
•	 surveillance may be conducted for a shorter 
period; 
•	 data collection methods may be simpler, more 
observational, and involve active surveillance 
methodologies; 
•	 case definitions may be simpler, involve a few 
critical conditions, and may not require laboratory 
confirmation; and 
•	 information will be used for immediate action and 
mortality reduction.  
On the other hand, during the recovery or mitigation 
phase, 
•	 surveillance can be transitioned to a passive 
system; 
•	 data collection methods may be more complex 
and involve entire populations; 
•	 instead of sentinels, data collection may be 
incorporated into the established health care or 
health information infrastructures; 
•	  case definitions may be more complex, involving 
laboratory diagnosis and a larger number of 
conditions; and 
•	  information may be used for a wider range of long-
term health and monitoring needs, addressing less 
urgent information needs, and assessing quality of 
care and intervention effectiveness.19
Additionally, deaths can be characterized according 
to whether they occur before, during, or after impact 
of a disaster to provide more detailed information on 
how to prevent injuries and death.6 
Figure 1. The Disaster Cycle (Source: FEMA)
       27
Conclusion
IMAGE
Whether you already have a system for conducting 
disaster surveillance or are just beginning, evaluating 
these systems regularly is important. Evaluation is 
the periodic assessment of a surveillance system 
for its quality, efficiency, and usefulness toward 
achieving the overall objectives of the system.12,69,70 
This process ensures that the system is effectively 
monitoring disaster-related health events.69 To help 
in guiding such evaluations, CDC has published 
“Updated guidelines for evaluating public health 
surveillance systems” (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/rr5013a1.htm).69 The guidelines 
outline a systematic method for approaching 
surveillance system evaluations. It has been used 
to evaluate several disaster-related mortality 
surveillance systems including Hurricane Ike in 
2008.71,72
Conducting surveillance during disasters is a 
necessary but often complicated task. How you 
conduct disaster surveillance will be influenced by 
many factors and challenges. You can use the various 
existing tools and resources described in this primer 
to help address these challenges and effectively 
track disaster-related morbidity and mortality. 
The data you collect can provide decision makers 
with the information to make informed decisions. 
We hope the information presented here prompts 
public health departments to consider and begin 




Active surveillance — A surveillance system in which public health staff members regularly contact health 
care providers, laboratories, hospitals, the public, and others to seek information about health conditions for 
a limited period, usually weeks or months.
Case definition — A set of standard criteria for classifying whether a person has a particular disease, 
syndrome, or other health condition. A case definition frequently includes criteria for person, place, and 
time.
Disaster — A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material, or 
environmental loss that exceeds the local capacity to respond, requiring external assistance.
Disaster epidemiology — The use of epidemiology to measure the short- and long-term health effects of 
disasters and to predict the consequences of future disasters.
Disaster related health effects — Direct and indirect effects:
Direct – Health effects caused by the actual physical forces or essential elements of the disaster.
Indirect – Health effects caused secondarily by anticipation of the disaster or by unsafe or unhealthy 
conditions that develop in connection with the disaster.
Disaster surveillance — An epidemiologic tool that provides ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of data on injuries, illnesses, and deaths. The information is used in planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of public health response. It enables public health agencies to track and identify morbidity 
and mortality linked to an event and provides information for future disaster response.
Incidence — The occurrence of new cases of disease or injury in a population over a specified period (e.g., 
total number of head and neck injuries in one week). 
Morbidity — The state of being ill or diseased, or the incidence or prevalence of illness in a population.
Mortality — The incidence of death in a population relating to many different types of conditions.
Passive surveillance — Regular reporting of disease data by health institutions that see patients and are 
part of a reporting network. There is no active searching for cases. Cases are reported through passive 
notification by health care facilities or practitioners
Rates — Measures of risk that allow comparison of the frequency of morbidity and mortality in different 
geographic locations, times, or population groups.
Sentinel Surveillance — An active surveillance system that collects data from a limited number of recruited 
participants or providers to report on specific health events to estimate trends in the larger affected 
population.
Syndromic Surveillance — An active or passive surveillance system that uses signs and symptoms, primary 
complaints or presumptive diagnoses, or other characteristics of a disease to define cases, rather than using 
specific clinical or laboratory diagnostic criteria.
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CDC Ready-to-Use Morbidity and Mortality Surveillance Form Templates  
http://emergency.cdc.gov/disasters/surveillance/
CDC “Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems”  
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5013a1.htm
CSTE Occupational Health Subcommittee 
http://www.cste.org/members/group.aspx?id=106606
CDC List of Occupational Safety and Health Contacts at State and Territorial Health Departments 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/statosh.html
CDC Occupational Health Surveillance Resources 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/surveillance/
Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance (ERHMS) 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/erhms/default.html
CDC “Planning for an Emergency: Strategies for Identifying and Engaging At-Risk Groups” 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/hsb/disaster/atriskguidance.pdf
ATSDR “The Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)” 
http://svi.cdc.gov/
CDC “Public Health Workbook to Define, Locate, and Reach Special, Vulnerable, and At-Risk 
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